Abstract: An imitation game is a finite two person normal form game in which the two players have the same set of pure strategies and the goal of the second player is to choose the same pure strategy as the first player. Gale et al. (1950) gave a way of passing from a given two person game to a symmetric game whose symmetric Nash equilibria are in oneto-one correspondence with the Nash equilibria of the given game. We give a way of passing from a given symmetric two person game to an imitation game whose Nash equilibria are in one-to-one correspondence with the symmetric Nash equilibria of the given symmetric game. Lemke (1965) portrayed the Lemke-Howson algorithm as a special case of the Lemke paths algorithm. Using imitation games, we show how Lemke paths may be obtained by projecting Lemke-Howson paths.
Introduction
An imitation game is a finite two person normal form game in which the two players have the "same" sets of pure strategies. That is, they have the same number of pure strategies, and there is a given bijection between the two sets of pure strategies that identifies each pure strategy of the first player with a particular pure strategy of the second player. The first player is called the mover ; she can have any payoff matrix. The second player, who is called the imitator, receives a payoff of 1 if she plays "the same" pure strategy as the mover, and otherwise her payoff is 0, so her payoff matrix is the identity matrix. Imitation games are evidently a special, and seemingly rather simple, type of two person game.
It turns out that from the point of view of computation, imitation games, and their Nash equilibria, are as complex as general two person games and their Nash equilibria. This paper shows how, in two different settings, observations along these lines complete a circle of ideas, with the result that phenomena that had for many years seemed to be distinct are actually superficially different manifestations of a single mathematical structure. In the remainder of the introduction we give very brief and informal descriptions of our findings.
A general two person game is given by a pair (A, B) of m × n payoff matrices. Gale et al. (1950) showed that if all the entries of A and B are positive and
then the symmetric equilibria of the two person game (C, C T ) are in one-to-one correspondence with the Nash equilibria of the given game. The Nash equilibria of (A, B) are unaffected by the addition of a constant to all the entries of A and B, so this gives a sense (described precisely in Section 3) in which any computational problem related to the Nash equilibria of two person games is "easier" than the corresponding problem for symmetric equilibria of symmetric games: given an algorithm A for the corresponding problem, there is an algorithm for the given problem consisting of adding a sufficiently large constant to all entries of A and B, forming C as above, and then applying A to (C, C T ).
However, as we will see in more detail shortly, for any square matrix C the symmetric equilibria of (C, C T ) are in natural one-to-one correspondence with the Nash equilibria of the imitation game (C, I). Given an algorithm B for the given problem related to Nash equilibrium, there is an algorithm for the corresponding problem related to symmetric equilibria of symmetric games consisting of applying B to (C, I). Lemke and Howson (1964) gave a pivoting algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium of (A, B) that came to be known as the Lemke-Howson algorithm. Generalizing slightly, it will be helpful to think of the input as consisting of a pair (A, B)
together with pair (p, q) whose components are an m-vector and an n-vector. Sub-sequently Lemke (1965) described a family of computational procedures that take as input a pair (C, r) consisting of an p × p matrix C and an p-vector r. This procedure, which came to be known as the Lemke paths algorithm, includes the Lemke-Howson algorithm as the special case that arises when p = m + n and C is derived from (A, B) as above. For each integer k ≥ 1 let e k := (1, . . . , 1) ∈ R k . Our contribution here is to show that the Lemke paths algorithm can by obtained by applying the Lemke-Howson algorithm to (C, I) and (r, e p ) ∈ R 2p .
This observation has an interesting application to the theory of the worst case running times of these algorithms. 
Symmetric Games and Linear Complementarity Problems
For each integer k ≥ 1 let ∆ k be the standard unit simplex in R k , i.e., the set of vectors whose components are nonnegative and sum to one. A Nash equilibrium of the game (A, B) is a pair (σ, τ ) ∈ ∆ m × ∆ n such that σ T Aτ ≥σ T Aτ for allσ ∈ ∆ m and σ T Bτ ≥ σ T Bτ for allτ ∈ ∆ n . A symmetric game is a game (C, C T ) where C is a square matrix, and ρ ∈ R m is a symmetric equilibrium of (C, C T ) if (ρ, ρ) is a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 2.1 (Gale et al. (1950) ). Suppose A and B are m × n matrices whose entries are all positive, and let
For ρ ∈ ∆ m+n the following are equivalent:
(a) ρ is a symmetric equilibrium of (C, C T );
(b) there are σ ∈ ∆ m , τ ∈ ∆ n , and 0 < α < 1 such that:
(ii) (σ, τ ) is a Nash equilibrium of (A, B), and
Proof. First suppose that ρ is a symmetric equilibrium of (C, C T ). We have ρ = ((1 − α)σ, ατ ) for some σ ∈ ∆ m , τ ∈ ∆ n , and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. In view of the identity (σ, 0) T C(σ, 0) = 0 = (0, τ ) T C(0, τ ) and the fact that entries of B and C are all positive, it cannot be the case that α = 0 or α = 1. Because α < 1, in the game (B, C) the strategy σ is a best response for agent 1 to τ , and similarly τ is a best response for agent 2 to σ. In addition, (σ, 0) and (0, τ ) are both best responses to
Now suppose that (b) holds. It is easily verified that (σ, 0) and (0, τ ) are best responses to ρ := ((1 − α)σ, ατ ) in (C, C T ), so any convex combination of (σ, 0) and (0, τ ), such as ρ, is also a best response to ρ.
An imitation game is a game (C, I) in which C is a square matrix and I is the identity matrix. Whenever g and h are integers with g ≤ h we let [g, h] := {g, . . . , h}. For any integer k ≥ 1 the support of µ ∈ ∆ k is
Let p be the number of rows and columns of C. An I-equilibrium of an imitation game (C, I) is a mixed strategy ρ ∈ ∆ p for the imitator such that
Proposition 2.2. A mixed strategy ρ ∈ ∆ p is an I-equilibrium of (C, I) if and only if there is an ι ∈ ∆ p such that (ι, ρ) is a Nash equilibrium of (C, I).
Proof. If (ι, ρ) is a Nash equilibrium of (C, I), then the support of ρ is contained in the support of ι, because ρ is a best response to ι for the imitator, and the support of ι is contained argmax i∈I (Cρ) i , because ι is a best response to ρ for the mover.
Thus, the support of ρ is contained in argmax i∈I (Cρ) i . Now suppose ρ is an I-equilibrium of (C, I). Because the set of best responses to ρ contains the support of ρ, we may choose an ι ∈ ∆ p that assigns all probability to best responses to ρ (so ι is a best response to ρ) and maximal probability to elements of the support of ρ (so ρ is a best response to ι).
In addition to symmetric equilibria of symmetric games, I-equilibria of imitation games, and Nash equilibria of imitation games, a fourth formulation of the problem will be important in what follows. A linear complementarity problem (LCP) is a problem of the form
where the p × p matrix C and the vector r ∈ R p are given and vectors z, w ∈ R p are sought. The LCP is said to be monotone if all the entries of C are positive. The extensive literature on the linear complementarity problem is surveyed in Murty (1988) and Cottle et al. (1992) .
Proposition 2.3. For an p × p matrix C with positive entries and ρ ∈ ∆ p the following are equivalent:
(b) ρ is an I-equilibrium of (C, I);
(c) there is ι ∈ ∆ m such that (ι, ρ) is a Nash equilibrium of (C, I);
Proof. The equivalence of (a) and (b) is immediate. The equivalence of (b) and (c) is Proposition 2.2. To complete the proof we show that (b) and (d) are equivalent. If (w, z) is a solution of the LCP with z = 0, then ρ := z/ m i=1 z i is an I-equilibrium of the imitation game (C, I), because the complementarity condition z, w = 0 means precisely that each pure strategy for the first agent is either unused (that is, ρ i = 0) or gives the maximal expected payoff. Conversely, if ρ is an I-equilibrium, we can obtain a solution of the LCP by setting z := αρ where α > 0 is chosen to make the smallest component of w := e p − Cz zero.
The route by which two person games have traditionally been understood to give rise to linear complementarity problems is as follows. Adding a constant to all entries of either of the matrices A and B does not change the set of Nash equilibria of a game (A, B), and in this sense requiring all of their entries to be positive is without loss of generality. Let A and B be m × n matrices with positive entries, let p := m + n, and for any natural number k let e k := (1, . . . , 1) ∈ R k . Consider the
There is a "trivial" solution (u, v, x, y) = (e m , e n , 0, 0). Any other solution necessarily has both x = 0 and y = 0, and σ := x/ x i and τ := y/ y j constitute a Nash equilibrium. Conversely, if (σ, τ ) is a Nash equilibrium, and α and β are the smallest positive numbers such that all components of A(βτ ) and B T (ασ) are not greater than 1, then u := e m − Ay, v := e n − B T x, x := ασ, and y := βτ constitute a solution to the LCP above.
As Proposition 2.3 explains, the notion of an I-equilibrium of an imitation game provides a distinct route by which games lead to LCP's.
Computation
In this section we recall certain basic concepts of computer science and relate them to the results above. A computational problem is a correspondence from a space of allowed inputs to a space of allowed outputs, both of which are subsets of the space of finite bit strings. An algorithm for such a problem is a Turing machine that converts any element of the space of inputs into one of its allowed outputs. An algorithm is polynomial time if its running time is bounded above by a polynomial function of the size of the input. A computational problem is polynomial if it has a polynomial time algorithm.
A computational problem is a decision problem if its space of outputs is {0, 1} = {NO, YES} and for each input there is only one allowed output. The class of polynomial decision problems is denoted by P. A decision problem is in NP if, whenever the desired output is YES, there is a "witness" and a polynomial time procedure taking the problem and the witness as inputs that verifies that the desired output is YES. For example, the problem of determining whether a graph has a kclique is in NP because any k-clique is a suitable witness. Clearly P ⊂ NP, and it is thought to be extremely likely that the containment is strict, but whether this is actually the case is one of the most prominent open problems in mathematics.
Given two computational problems P and Q, a reduction from Q to P is a pair of maps, one of which takes an input x for Q to an input r(x) for P , and the other of which takes an output y of P to an output s(y) of Q, such that s transforms any of the desired outputs of P for r(x) to one of the desired outputs of Q for x. The reduction is a polynomial time reduction 1 if the size of the output of P for r(x) is bounded by a polynomial function of the size of x and there are polynomial time algorithms that compute the values of r and s.
Suppose C is a class of computational problems and P ∈ C. We say that P is C-complete if every problem in C has a polynomial time reduction to P . Gilboa and Zemel (1989) show that many decision problems related to Nash equilibria of two person games (Is there more than one Nash equilibrium?, Is there a Nash equilibrium assigning positive probability to a certain pure strategy?, etc.) are NP- The most important reason for this is the fact that 2-Nash is a fixed point problem that is seemingly a small step beyond linear programming, which is in P. Hirsch et al. (1989) studied a discrete version of Brouwer's fixed point theorem that is based on function evaluation. Specifically, one is given an "oracle" or "black box" that computes the value of a function f : [0, 1] n → [0, 1] n , and the goal is to find a point x satisfying f (x)−x ≤ 2 −p . They show that if n ≥ 3 and x → f (x)−x is known to be Lipschitzian with Lipschitz constant L, then any algorithm must, in the worst case, evaluate the function at at least (c(2 p − 10)L) n−2 points, where c is a positive constant. Specifically, they construct a collection of example functions such that, when np is sufficiently large, any smaller number of function evaluations will necessarily fail to distinguish between two examples that have different fixed points.
The fixed point problems that arise in practice typically come from applications that endow them with additional structure. In order to systematically study the possibility that such structure might allow more efficient computation, Papadimitriou (1994b) introduced the computational class PPAD. The search space of a problem in PPAD is the set {0, 1} r of bitstrings of length r for some natural number r. An element of PPAD has two inputs. The first is a Turing machine M, whose worst case running time is bounded by a polynomial function of r, with the following properties. Given an input from the search space, M outputs a "predecessor" in {0, 1} r (or an indication that the bitstring is a source) and a "successor" in {0, 1} r (or an indication that the bitstring is a sink). The input cannot coincide with either the predecessor or the successor, it is the successor of its predecessor when it is not a source, and it is the predecessor of its successor when it is not a sink. Thus the Turing machine computes a directed graph whose vertices are the bitstrings and whose maximum in-degree and maximum out-degree are both one.
The second input is an element of the search space that is known to be a source.
The desired output is a bitstring that is either a sink or a different source.
Given a method of computing values of a continuous function from the ndimensional unit simplex to itself, the Scarf algorithm follows such a path in a graph to an approximate fixed point. The algorithms described in subsequent sections are also based on following paths in graphs. Papadimitriou (1994b) showed how to display the problem solved by the Scarf algorithm as a member of PPAD if the function evaluations are performed by a Turing machine that is sufficiently fast. Iterative search can be used to solve a problem in PPAD, but there is also the possibility that for certain types of problems there may be algorithms that exploit additional structure that will be embedded in M. The Lemke-Howson algorithm, which is based on combinatoric search rather than topology, is a concrete instance of this possibility.
Recently, culminating a rapid sequence of developments (Goldberg and Chen and Deng (2005a)) Chen and Deng (2005b) have given a polynomial time reduction from PPAD to 2-Nash, so 2-Nash is PPAD-complete. Especially in view of the result of Hirsch et al. (1989) , it seems extremely unlikely that there is a polynomial time algorithm for PPAD, so this finding is regarded as compelling evidence that there is no polynomial time algorithm for 2-Nash, even if it does not quite amount to a complete proof.
Proposition 2.3 implies that there is a polynomial time reduction passing between any two of the following problems.
(i) 2-Nash.
(ii) Finding an I-equilibrium of an imitation game.
(iii) Finding a symmetric equilibrium of a symmetric game.
(iv) Finding a solution of an LCP w + Cz = r, z ≥ 0, w ≥ 0, z, w = 0 with all entries of C and r positive.
This result complements the work described above: in addition to fully embodying the complexity of PPAD, to a greater extent than had been known previously 2-Nash turns out to be a unifying aspect of the computational theory of games and linear complementarity problems.
The Lemke Paths Algorithm
In the remainder we study specific algorithms that have been applied to 2-Nash and linear complementarity problems. In this section we study the Lemke paths algorithm in its application to the LCP
where C is a p × p matrix and r ∈ R p . (Except in special settings described later, we impose no restrictions on the signs of the entries of C and r.) For z ∈ R p let w(z) := r − Cz. Let
If Z is nonempty it is a convex polyhedron.
A label is a pair λ = (λ z , λ w ) in which λ z and λ w are subsets of [1, p] . For z ∈ Z let ℓ(z) = (ℓ z (z), ℓ w (z)) where
For a label λ let
We say that λ is feasible if Z λ is nonempty. If λ is feasible, then Z λ is the relative interior of a convex polyhedron.
We will only consider nondegenerate problems. Let |λ| := |λ z | + |λ w | where the summands are the cardinalities of λ z and λ w . The pair (C, r) is nondegenerate if Z λ = ∅ whenever |λ| < p and has the "expected" dimension |λ| − p whenever it is nonempty. Various techniques are known for extending the Lemke paths and Lemke-Howson algorithms to degenerate problems. For the most part we expect the main point made here to extend to those techniques, but we will not consider the issue explicitly.
A basis is a label β such that |β| = p. If β is feasible, then nondegeneracy implies that Z β is a singleton whose unique element will be denoted by z β , and we will usually write w β in place of w(z β ). The basis is complementary if β z ∪β w = [1, p] or, equivalently, β z ∩ β w = ∅. When the LCP given by C and r is nondegenerate Note that if β is complementary, it is ℓ-almost complementary for any ℓ. When β is ℓ-almost complementary but not complementary there is a missing label h such that
in which case ε z ∪ ε w = [1, p] because |ε| = p + 1. Let Z ℓ be the union of the sets Z ε for all ℓ-almost complementary edge labels ε and the sets Z β for all ℓ-almost complementary bases β. The Lemke paths algorithm is derived from the geometric properties of Z ℓ .
If ε is an ℓ-almost complementary edge label and β is obtained from ε by dropping one element of ε z or ε w , then β is ℓ-almost complementary. In particular, β is feasible and ℓ-almost complementary whenever ε is a feasible ℓ-almost complementary edge label and z β is an endpoint of Z ε .
Suppose that β is a feasible basis and ε is obtained from β by adding one element, say i * , to β z . Then ε is feasible. In detail, the solution set of the the system of p − 1 equations that require that z i = 0 if i / ∈ ε z and w j = 0 if j / ∈ ε w consists of z β and two rays, on one of which z i * is positive, and at points on this ray near z β the variables z i for i ∈ ε z and w j for j ∈ ε w are all positive. A similar argument shows that ε is feasible when it is obtained from β by adding one element to β w .
If β is feasible and complementary, there is precisely one way to obtain an ℓ-complementary edge label by adding an element to either β z or β w , namely adding ℓ to whichever set does not already contain it. Therefore z β is an endpoint of Z ε for precisely one ℓ-almost complementary edge label ε. If β is feasible and ℓ-almost The phrase "Lemke paths algorithm" is a bit imprecise insofar as additional conditions are required before one has an algorithm in the sense of a well defined computational procedure that is guaranteed to halt in finite time. Specifically, there must be a way to find a half line in Z ℓ or a complementary feasible basis β. The connected component of Z ℓ containing the starting point cannot be homeomorphic to a circle, so the pivoting procedure beginning there cannot cycle and must eventually terminate at z β for some complementary feasible β or at a half line.
As is explained in Lemke (1965) and other sources, a variety of assumptions on the given data allow one to find starting points of the process for which success The numerical implementation of the pivoting procedure of the Lemke paths algorithm, and related algorithms below, is usually described in terms of updating a "tableau," and may be thought of as a matter of using the sorts of pivots involved in Gaussian elimination to update a coordinate system that, at each step, has as its coordinates the variables z i for i ∈ β z and w j for j ∈ β w for some ℓ-almost complementary β, translated to place the origin at z β . Detailed descriptions of this numerical procedure can be found in many sources, but our analysis will not refer to them.
Lemke Howson from Lemke Paths
In order to display the Lemke-Howson algorithm as a special case of the Lemke paths algorithm we now specialize to the case of an LCP in which the matrix has the block structure that occurs in the application to two person games. Let p = m + n where m and n are both positive integers, and let A and B be m × n matrices. We study
For x ∈ R m and y ∈ R n let 
where
and for y ∈ Y let
. For a label λ let
If λ is feasible, then linear algebra implies that the dimension of X λ is at least |λ x | + |λ v | − n and the dimension of Y λ is at least |λ y | + |λ u | − m, so nondegeneracy implies that the dimension of X λ is exactly |λ x | + |λ v | − n and the dimension of Y λ is exactly |λ y | + |λ u | − m. As before, a basis is a label β with
If β is feasible, then |β x | + |β v | = n and |β y | + |β u | = m. An edge label ε is an X-edge label if |ε x | + |ε v | = n + 1 and |ε y | + |ε u | = m, and it is a Y -edge label if |ε x | + |ε v | = n and |ε y | + |ε u | = m + 1. When ε is feasible one of these two cases holds, and we say that Z ε is either an X-edge or a Y -edge as the case may be.
Suppose that β is a feasible basis that is ℓ-almost complementary but not complementary, and let h be the missing label of β. If 1 ≤ h ≤ m then the ℓ-almost complementary edge label obtained by adding h to β x is an X-edge label and the ℓ-almost complementary edge label obtained by adding h to β u is a Y -edge label. If m + 1 ≤ h ≤ m + n then the ℓ-almost complementary edge label obtained by adding h to β v is an X-edge label and the ℓ-almost complementary edge label obtained by adding h to β y is a Y -edge label. In either case, of the two edges in Z ℓ that have z β as an endpoint, one is an X-edge and the other is a Y -edge, so that we may think of any path in Z ℓ as an alternation between moves in X and moves in Y . But without further assumptions the projections of a path in Z ℓ onto X and Y need not be one dimensional manifolds.
The derivation of the Lemke-Howson algorithm per se is as follows. Suppose that all the entries of A and B are positive, and that p = e m and q = e n . Then z = 0 ∈ R p is complementary, but does not correspond to a Nash equilibrium. For any ℓ there is a path in Z ℓ starting at 0 that leads to z β ℓ for some feasible complementary basis β ℓ . Necessarily z β ℓ = 0, and complementarity, together with the block structure of C, imply that x β ℓ = 0 and y β ℓ = 0, so that rescaling these vectors by dividing by the sum of components gives a Nash equilibrium. If more than one equilibrium is sought then, in addition to finding each z β ℓ , one can follow the paths in Z ℓ ′ beginning at z β ℓ when ℓ ′ = ℓ, then continue in this fashion recursively at any new equilibria that are found. Wilson gave an example (reported in Shapley (1974) ) of a game with equilibria that are inaccessible in the sense that this procedure does not find them.
From Lemke-Howson to Lemke Paths
For the most part the material in the last two section has been well known since Lemke (1965) . We now present this paper's contribution to the understanding of these algorithms, which is a derivation of the Lemke paths, in a special case of the framework above, as projections of the Lemke-Howson paths onto Y .
Continuing with the setup of the last section, we now specialize further, assuming that n = m, that B = I is the m × m identity matrix, and that q = e m . We now Conversely:
is the unique complementary basis with π(β) = α, and α is feasible, then so is β.
Proof. Suppose that β is a basis such that π(β) = α, i.e., β y = α y and β u = α u . Proof. Let ε be a feasible Y -edge label. If ε is ℓ-almost complementary, then 
In all four cases π(β) is ℓ-almost complementary.
We now analyze the preimages of a feasible ℓ-almost complementary Y -basis.
There are two cases, according to whether α is complementary. Lemma 6.6. Let α be a complementary feasible Y -basis, and let
If ℓ / ∈ α u , then there is no other feasible ℓ-almost complementary basis β ′ with π(β ′ ) = α, and when ℓ ∈ α u there is exactly one such β ′ , and z β and z β ′ are the endpoints of a feasible ℓ-almost complementary X-edge. If ℓ + m / ∈ α y , then there is no other feasible (ℓ + m)-almost complementary basis β ′ with π(β ′ ) = α, and when ℓ + m ∈ α u there is exactly one such β ′ , in which case z β and z β ′ are the endpoints of a feasible (ℓ + m)-almost complementary X-edge.
Proof. Let β ′ be a feasible basis that is not complementary with π(β ′ ) = α.
That is, when ℓ ∈ α u it must be the case that
, which means that h = ℓ. That is, when ℓ + m ∈ α y we have Proof. Let β be a feasible basis with π(β) = α. Since π(β) is not complementary,
Thus the only possibilities for β are
and in fact both are feasible and ℓ-almost complementary. Note that
is a feasible ℓ-almost complementary X-edge label.
Now assume that β is (ℓ + m)-almost complementary. We have
and β y = α y , so
Therefore it is only possible that β is either 
Concluding Remarks
We have shown that the solutions of several problems are in one-to-one correspondence. This implies that the computational problem of finding a solution of one of these problems is the same as the problem of finding a solution to any other.
That is, these problems are all avatars of 2-Nash. We have also shown that the Lemke-Howson algorithm for 2-Nash and the Lemke paths algorithm for LCP's are essentially the same, thereby achieving a unified understanding of their exponential worst case complexity.
In linear programming worst case complexity presents a relatively coarse and somewhat misleading view of the subject: although the simplex algorithm has exponential worst case complexity, various investigations of its mean time complexity
show it to be quite fast. The results described in Section 3 show that from the point of view of worst case complexity, any problem in PPAD is equivalent to 2-Nash, but it may still be the case that different problems have very different degrees of difficulty in practice. The Lemke-Howson algorithm routinely solves two person games with hundreds of pure strategies, and recently Porter et al. (2004) and Sun et al. (2006) have presented experimental evidence suggesting that simple search methods can result in faster mean performance. We hope that a deeper understanding of the complexity of 2-Nash will emerge from analysis of the mean time complexity of Lemke-Howson, and perhaps other algorithms, for natural and tractable distributions on the space of games.
